Clrfund - a permissionless and trust-minimized Quadratic Funding protocol

General Information

  • Project Name: clrfund

  • Project Description and why it’s classified as a Public Good: is a permissionless and trust-minimized Quadratic Funding protocol. It uses Minimal Anti-Collusion Infrastructure (MACI) to protect against various forms of bribery and collusion with the use of zk-SNARKs. To protect from Sybil attacks it can use BrightID or a similar identity system. runs a continuous sequence of Quadratic Funding rounds, where anyone is able to add public goods projects as funding “recipients”, contribute funds to the matching pool (“matching funds”), and contribute funds to individual recipients. To ensure that only public goods are added as recipients can use curation mechanism such as Kleros Curate.

To become a primary fund allocation protocol for the Ethereum network, must develop the following properties:

A. Credibly neutral

In carrying out its purpose, the protocol must not discriminate for or against any specific people, and this property must be both reliable and reasonably demonstrable to both participants and external observers.

1. Permissionless

Every member of the Ethereum Ecosystem who desires to participate in deciding where funds should be allocated should be able to do so.

2. Trustless

The protocol should place as little trust in operators or other individuals as possible. The less the protocol relies on such actors, the more credible its neutrality will be.

3. Decentralized

No central party or parties should have control over funds or be responsible for the allocation of funds. Power and control should be as widely distributed as possible so that the Ethereum Network cannot be captured or corrupted.

Fund allocation responsibility and decision-making should be as widely distributed as possible to capture as much information about the needs of the Ethereum network as possible.

  • Main Project Funding Sources:

Grants and clrfund round! We can ‘dogfood’ the tool by including clrfund as a grantee in our own rounds too.

  • Team Information, including backgrounds and roles:

Auryn (
QZ (
Yuetloo (

  • Social Credibility (development progress, awards, notable GitHub commits, referrals):



Project repo has completed 8 rounds to ramp up its infrastructure before running a 440k USD round with ETHStaker in April 2022 and a 292k USD round with ETH Colombia in October 2022.

Through running rounds, has received ~20k USD from a total of ~60k USD across 9 rounds. All information is documented on’s blog ( including rounds that ran into issues and couldn’t disburse.

Eligibility Criteria are also essential, so make sure to review them to ensure that your project aligns with what’s listed below:

  • Do you have a commitment to open-source (i.e. every open-source license accepted by the Open-Source Initiative) technology and sharing results publicly?

Yes! It’s open source as set in our constitution.

  • Have you provided transparency about how exactly funding will be used?

We intend to use the funds allocated in Epoch Zero to further improve the deployment of QF rounds and the onboarding process for round participants and donors. As the Ethereum ecosystem continues to grow, there are new opportunities to experiment with QF as a curation and funding mechanism and hopes to remain as a technical partner with our communities and iterate towards helping our product be self-service.

  • Are you advancing values of freedom and privacy (no surveillance and handling of personal data)?

To remain credibly neutral within an open and adversarial environment, the must be robust to multiple types of attacks and manipulation, including collusion, bribery, blackmail, griefing, and sybil attacks.

1. Collusion

Individual parties must not be able to coordinate such that they or their interests each receive more funding than they would receive if all parties were to act of their own accord.

2. Bribery and blackmail

Individual parties must not be able to profitably pay off or otherwise induce other parties to take actions that increase the funding received by the inducing party over and above what the inducing party would receive if the induced party were to act of their own accord.

3. Griefing

Individual parties must not be able to prevent other parties from taking actions within the protocol or from such actions having their intended effect.

4. Sybil-resistant

The protocol must be able to attribute all of the actions taken by a given individual to said individual.

  • Are you supporting decentralization in various fields (for example building Web3 projects)?

Our grantees are public goods too! So yes! We are a public good helping public goods.