Incentivizing impact evaluation

Following up on our discussion on incentivized impact evaluation; I wrote an article a few months back on how we can have a system where participants identify the most impactful projects and assign value to them accordingly.

The goal is to make this process scalable at the level of the economy (and self-sustainable), but this can also be implemented on a much smaller scale:
From Regen to Degen?

Obviously a lot more to dig into here, since what Octant is trying to achieve currently is mostly better signal from the community on the impact of projects in its funding rounds. But thought this is a good starting point for this discussion

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Thanks for picking this up. So as I understand it, the devil is in the details if I remember your point correctly, and so we really want to nail the implementation.

I’ll dig into the article, and come back with some questions if I have any.l

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I recently published a post on Randomized Voter Sampling (RVS), which is basically the idea that you can have a scalable mechanism where proposers have an incentive to accurately evaluate the impact of projects, and a randomized voter pool then validates the proposal.

The idea is to create an economic incentive for users to accurately evaluate the impact of projects, and prevent gaming of the system/collusion between proposers and validators (while ensuring that the broader community trusts the legitimacy of the process).

By having random voter selection the proposer cannot manipulate the vote; they cannot push their friends/sybils/etc to vote on the proposal, for example. This also eliminates Keynesian beauty contest dynamics, which is a persistent problem in PGF these days, where projects are judged based on popularity rather than merit/impact.

In RVS the size of the sample is proportional to the proposed impact of a project, so more voters are required to validate (potentially) more impactful projects. At the same time the proposer has to stake more funds for more impactful projects. This serves to reduce frivolous proposals (funds can be slashed for overvalued proposals), makes proposers focus on accurate evaluation, and allows the community to properly allocate resources for project reviews (which also makes the system scalable)

We will be testing the RVS mechanism in Impact 2.0 on Farcaster